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ARGUMENT
Defendants admission, "Defendants agree with the majority of Plaintiffs'
'Statements of the Case,'" is no small admission. For therein the defendants admit, of
course, that the plaintiffs have suffered an injury for which the defendants are potentially
liable, but defendants also freely admit that plaintiffs filed a notice of claim within a year
of the accident, that the notices of claim were sent to and received at the county clerk's
office and Karla Johnson, the Clerk Auditor of Kane County signed for the notices.
Nevertheless, the defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims should be summarily defeated.
Therefore, the notice was in fact delivered to the county clerk's office and the
County Clerk Auditor signed for the notice. The real dispute in this matter is the effect of
plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to the county clerk, so far as that term is construed
to mean that the notice must bear the clerk's name, since there is no real dispute that the
notices were sent to the address of the county clerk.
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a situation where the
purposes of the notices statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed.
I.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS SUFFICIENT
Defendants allege that plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to the county clerk

renders the notice fatally defective. Defendants' analysis ignores a salient fact. To
accept defendants analysis this court must hold that unless the county clerk's name is
found on the notice, the notice is defective. In this case the notices was addressed to the
office where the county clerk is found. In this sense the notice was "directed" and

"delivered" to the office of the county clerk. Karla Johnson, the person signing for the
notice, by her own admission "handles the clerk portion of the statutes" (See Exhibit "A"
deposition of Karla Johnson p. 5, line 6-8).
Defendant's argument ignores the most elementary distinction between the facts of
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp..1 and the present factual scenario. In Bellonio, the
notice was sent to the airport attorney, an attorney representing the entity of the airport,
and not to the city attorney or any person representing the city, where the city was the
entity concerned. In other words, the Bellonio case presents a scenario where no notice
was given to the proper entity. Thereby, defendants missed the critical distinction in
Bellonio, where the court found that the airport attorney was not the agent for the city.
In contrast, in the present circumstances county clerk's office received the notice
and the county clerk auditor signed for them herself.
Defendants have not argued that Kane County did not have an opportunity to settle
this matter without the expenses of litigation. The defendants have not argued that the
notices were untimely or otherwise defective. In fact, the attorneys for Kane county
acted upon the notices of claim. Thus, the defendants cannot argue that the purposes of
the notice claim statutes have not been fulfilled. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999
UT 36,^1 20, 977, P.2d 1201.
Conspicuously absent form the defendants' analysis is any argument that they
have been prejudiced in any way. In the present circumstances, addressing the notices to
the county commissioners in no way inhibited the settlement of plaintiffs' claims without

resort to litigation. In a related case, where the auto insurance brought suit for
subrogation Kane County confirmed that Kane County had a full opportunity to pursue
the claim as a result of the notice that was served. (See Exhibit "B" stipulation).
Defendants claim that the holding of Brittain v. State bv and through Utah Dept. of
Employ., 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) has no application to the present case. Once
again, defendants ignore the proposition for which Brittain was offered. First, Brittain
explained the purposes of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act,
that is, to "afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation" and "to arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate" to avoid the
expenses of litigation. Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671. Again, there is no question but that
those purposes have been fulfilled in the present case.
Further, Brittain essentially allowed for substantial compliance with the statutory
notice requirements. The Brittain court's holding, in the final analysis, was that the
plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements of the notice statute because the way the plaintiff
had viewed the statute was reasonable. In the present case, the purposes of the statutes
were fulfilled and the plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying upon the representations of
the Kane County attorney and the written confirmation of the attorneys hired for Kane
County that they possess the notices.
Finally, it is hardly inappropriate for the plaintiffs to cite the case of Stahl v. Utah
Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) when reviewing the purposes of the
Governmental Immunity Act where this and other Utah appellate courts have cited the
1

911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App.. 1996).

case for similar purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act where this and other Utah
appellate courts have cited the case for similar purposes. See Larson v. Park City Mun.
Corp.. 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998); Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1297; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278;
Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671. Further, while the Stahl court did not rest its opinion on the
doctrine of estoppel, the court did review the facts and circumstances of the case in that
light. Lastly, plaintiffs maintain that the distinction between the Transit Act and the
Governmental Immunity Act does not survive scrutiny. Both statutes provide that notice
"shall" be filed within a proscribed period. This court should take this opportunity to
adopt a common standard for such notice requirements.
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a situation where the
purposes of the notices statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed.
II.

ONLY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS TO

THE DELIVERY OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM
There is no dispute in the present matter that a notice of claim was presented
months before it would have been due and delivered to Kane County by way of the Kane
County Clerk's office. The Clerk Auditor signed for the certified letters enclosing the
notice of claims. It is further undisputed that the defendants acted upon these notices of
claim: the county attorney wrote to plaintiffs counsel acknowledging possession of the
notices of claim, and the attorneys hired for Kane County likewise acknowledged
possession of the notices of claim and requested further information. Defendants in no

wise argue to this court that strict compliance is the best rule of the State of Utah.
Instead, the sole argument of the defendants is that strict compliance has been the rule of
law for some time, should therefore be honored as tradition, and should therefore be
rashly enforced in the present circumstances.
However, as outlined in plaintiffs' principle brief, the strict compliance
requirement in Utah is judicially created. In fact, plaintiffs have pointed out that this
court accepted substantial compliance as the standard prior to its setting forth the strict
compliance standard. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966).
Citizens should be able to bring claims against the government where the
government or its agents have acted negligently. While limitation must be placed on
meritorious claims, those limitations can reasonably be fulfilled by requiring strict
compliance with the timing provisions of that statue, but allowing for substantial
compliance as to the form of the notice and its deliver. After all, a plaintiff must meet
two effective statues of limitation to bring a claim; first, the notice of claim must be
timely, and second the lawsuit itself must be filed within a year of the denial, express or
implied of the claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-14 (1965) and 63-30-15(2)(1987).
The factual background of this case shows how a better standard leads to more just
results. This court can continue to enforce the time requirements of the notice. There
must be a deadline somewhere in order for stability to be obtained. Likewise, this court
can continue to expect litigants to give notice to the appropriate entity. Clearly, and
entity cannot act upon a notice it never receives. However, where the correct entity

timely receives the notice and is afforded an opportunity to act thereon, the standard of
substantial compliance should be adopted.

CONCLUSION
BischeL Thimmes, and its progeny argue for allowing substantial compliance in
"unique" circumstances and where "the facts may be found with such certainty, and the
institute suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception."
Never has the situation occurred where the notice of claim would have been
sufficient on its face a mere one year earlier. Never has the situation occurred where the
notice of claim would have been sufficient on its face for the previous 25 years.
Certainly manifest injustice would be suffered in this case.
Because Kane County, the entity concerned, received the notice of claim, the
proper recipient for the notice of claim did in fact possess the notice of claim and because
injustice would occur not to include this matter as an exception the trial court's decision
to dismiss the matter must be reversed. Further, for the other reasons outlined in
plaintiffs' brief, the trial court's conclusion must be reversed and the matter be remanded
for trial.
DATED this V]

day, June, 2001.
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY

v Ronald E. Dalby
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

2

KANE COUNTY, KANAB DEPARTMENT

P
5
6

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah non-profit
corporation,

7

Plaintiff,

8

vs.

9
10

Civil No.
000600081PI

KANE COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Utah and MARC R.
McPHERSON, Kane County Sheriff's
deputy,

11
Defendants.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I'm the Kane County clerk auditor.

Q.

Define the term, "Kane County clerk

What is your occupation?

auditor," would you, please.
A.

I handle all of the clerk portion of the

statute, as well as the auditor portion of the
statute.
Q.

Okay.

Tell me your job description as far

as clerk is concerned.
A.

I do the elections.

I provide the

clerical for the Sixth District Court, and various
other duties as assigned.
Q.

And how long have you been engaged in this

capacity?
A.

Nine and a half years.

Q.

Are you also acquainted with the Kane

County Commission?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

What is your relationship with the

Kane County Commission?
A.

We have a working relationship.

Q.

Define the term, "working relationship,"

please.
A.

We work together in the same county.

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971
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EXHIBIT "B

1

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, KANA3 DEPARTMENT

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah non-profit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.
000600081PI

KANE COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Utah and MARC R.
McPHERSON, Kane County Sheriff's
deputy,
Defendants.

STIPULATION BETWEEN COUNSEL
Taken at the Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah
On Tuesday, May 1, 2 001
At 12:00 p.m.

Reported by:

J. Elizabeth Van Fleet, R?R, CSR

2

A P P E A R A N C E S
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
THOMAS A. DUFFIN, ESQ.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
PETER STIRBA, ESQ.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State, #1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ERIC S. LIND, ESQ.
34 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971

3

-oOoP R O C E E D I N G S

MR. STIRBA:

Counsel and I have had a

discussion about Deputy McPherson's deposition,
which is scheduled for May 2nd, and counsel has
indicated that the purpose of Deputy McPherson's
deposition was to elicit information about whether
or not the county has conducted an investigation
relating to the claim involving the accident that
relates to the Bear River matter.

And as we both

are aware, and I think we're in agreement, that the
supreme court has said that one of the purposes of a
Notice of Claim is to allow the governmental entity
to have a chance to investigate the merits of the
claim.
And I have represented to Mr. Duffin that
for purposes of our motion to dismiss that it's not
an argument that the county is going to make, that
is that somehow because of what happened the county
did not have an opportunity to investigate the
claim.
Our argument, as indicated in the motion
to dismiss, relates to the requirements under the
governmental immunity act that the notice be
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4

directed and delivered to the county clerk.
MR. DUFFIN:

Would you be willing to

stipulate, as part of that, that Kane County, as a
public body, had the full opportunity to pursue the
claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, as a
result of the notice that was served?
MR. STIRBA:

I would rather do this:

Rather than stipulate that as a factual matter,
indicate what I've indicated, that we are not going
to raise that as an argument with respect to our
motion, and if you make that argument under the
existing case law, you will not see any rebuttal
that somehow that is not the case.
MR. DUFFIN:

I want to make sure -- often

times stipulations -- and they've been tricky before
on this question before, counsel.

We're both aware

of that.
Mr. Stirba, on behalf of Kane County, will
you stipulate that you will not argue and that there
will not be a question raised or representation that
Kane County did not have a full opportunity to
pursue a timely investigation of the merits of the
Bear River claim?
MR. STIRBA:

That is something that I will

represent and stipulate that you will not see that

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971

1

argument made or a resistance, if, otherwise, in

2

your memorandum, you indicate what the policy

3

considerations are, that they were fulfilled in this

4

case.

5

MR. DUFFIN:

Counsel, there's a difference

6

between you will not raise the argument and a

7

stipulation that you will agree because that can be

8

tricky.

9

MR. STIRBA:

Well, I don't think the

10

record is really ambiguous at all, but you're asking

11

essentially for a factual stipulation.

12

prepared to do that.

13

I'm not

I am prepared, though, to make a record as

14

to how this process will unfold, that you will make

15

an argument that the policy underlying the Notice of

16

Claim has been fulfilled in this case as articulated

17

by the supreme court.

13

The only opportunity we have to respond to

19

that is in the reply memorandum, and I'm telling you

20

that we will not argue -- we will not make that

21

argument, as a matter of legal presentation or legal

22

fact, that that policy consideration, under these

23

facts, may very well have been fulfilled.

24

not our motion.

25

MR. DUFFIN:

That's

I don't know what we

4\\
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6

stipulated to, Peter.
MR. STIRBA:

My word is my bond, Tom.

MR. DUFFIN:

I will accept your --

MR. STIRBA:

What I've said I've said.

I

can't make it any clearer.
MR. DUFFIN:

Let's go off the record for a

minute.
(Off the record.)
MR. DUFFIN:

May we stipulate, Mr. Stirba,

that you will not argue to the trial court or at the
trial hearing, if that be the case, or in any --or
to any appellate court that Kane County did not have
an opportunity to timely investigate the merits of
this case?
MR. STIRBA:

Yes, and the only -- the only

caveat is, when you submit your memorandum in
opposition to our motion to dismiss, I certainly -if you otherwise do not accurately describe what the
supreme court has said, I would feel it would be
okay for me to point that out.
MR. DUFFIN:

Okay.

All right.

I don't

think we -- I don't think I need Mr. McPherson.
MR. STIRBA:

Okay.

So we've got an

agreement that Mr. McPherson is gone, and let's just
deal with Mr. Caroll at 1:00.

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971

7

MR. DUFFIN:

Okay.

(Thereupon, the stipulation
concluded at 12:05 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

I, J. Elizabeth Van Fleet, Registered
Professional Reporter, do hereby certify that I took
down in Stenotype all of the proceedings had in the
before-entitled matter at the time and place
indicated and that thereafter said shorthand notes
were transcribed into typewriting at and under my
direction and supervision and that the foregoing
transcript constitutes a full, true and accurate
record of the proceedings had.
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